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WILL GIDEON’S TRUMPET SOUND A NEW MELODY?
The Globalization of Constitutional Values and
Its Implications for a Right to
Equal Justice in Civil Cases
Hon. Earl Johnson, Jr.1
If the motto ‘and justice for all’ becomes ‘and justice for those who can
afford it,’ we threaten the very underpinnings of our social contract.
Ronald George, Chief Justice of California
State of the Judiciary speech, September 2001
In an article published a quarter century ago, I wrote with a note of
optimism:
Some propositions are so elemental and some developments so
long overdue that once implemented most Americans wonder how
democratic society could have functioned any other way.
Women’s suffrage, the elimination of de jure racial discrimination
and the right to counsel for indigent felony defendants are among
these phenomena. . . . [Likewise] [a]t some point, Americans will
look back and ask how concepts like “due process,” “equal
protection of the law” and “equal justice under law” were anything
but hollow phrases, while our society still tolerated the denial of
counsel to low-income civil litigants.2
As it turned out, in just the three years after that article was published, the
highest courts on two continents had occasion to address the issue of a
constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. Those courts reached very
different conclusions, however.
Many readers are familiar with what happened on one of those
continents—North America. In 1981, the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of N.C. held that our
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Constitution’s guarantee of “due process” does not provide a right to
counsel in civil cases, even when the government is taking away a mother’s
parental rights to her children.3 Furthermore, the five–four opinion created
a presumption against such a right in civil cases and fashioned a nearly
impossible test for overcoming that presumption.4
But what happened on the other continent—Europe? Two years before
Lassiter, in the case of Airey v. Ireland, the European Court of Human
Rights (European Court) considered the same fundamental issue in the case
of Airey v. Ireland.5 The European Court reached the opposite conclusion,
holding the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention) and its guarantee of a “fair hearing” in
civil cases required the government to provide free counsel to indigent civil
litigants, even though Ms. Airey’s case “only” involved her marital status
and right to financial support and other property rights.6
This leads to an obvious question: what is it about the U.S. Constitution
that is so different from the European Convention? The U.S. Constitution
guarantees American civil litigants due process.7 Similarly, the European
Convention guarantees European civil litigants a fair hearing.8 What is in
the language used in these two fundamental documents that might lead
courts interpreting those words to reach very different answers to such a
basic question? Is due process really something less than a fair hearing?
Or, are the two terms merely different ways of expressing the same basic
concept?
This question, in turn, leads back to that previously mentioned 1978
article on the right to counsel in civil cases and asks what might be learned
by exploring the same fundamental question from a broader perspective—a
perspective that takes into account what we share with other democracies
and what we may have to learn from those nations on this issue. The
following pages first explore the common source of the language expressing
the essential ingredients of the process used to resolve civil disputes found
in the constitutions of nearly every democratic nation on the face of the
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Earth. The article then discusses how supreme courts in different
jurisdictions have interpreted the constitutional language that emerged from
this common source. Next, the article explains the difference between an
absolute “right to counsel” in criminal cases and a “right to equal justice” in
civil cases, and explores how the latter might be administered. Finally, the
article inquires whether the developing global consensus on this issue may
ever influence our own country’s constitutional jurisprudence.

I. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND ITS “PRECEPT” THAT GOVERNMENT
IS TO PROVIDE EQUAL JUSTICE TO ALL ECONOMIC CLASSES
The search for the source of the relevant constitutional language begins
not on this continent or in this century, but in Europe in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. It was the intellectual ferment during those centuries
that produced the theory so influential with the drafters of nearly all the
constitutions found in the Western democracies—including our own. At
that time, most European nations had been ruled for centuries by kings and
emperors, absolute monarchs who claimed the source of their power
descended from God, and consequently they possessed a divine right to
govern the lesser mortals who populated their countries. Finally, many of
those lesser mortals had had enough. All across Europe, thoughts of
revolution—violent and political—were in the air. Still, the revolutionaries
lacked a satisfactory rationale to counter the religious-based divine right
theory.
Then a group of brilliant political philosophers began espousing one
version or another of a brand new vision—the social contract. As men like
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke explained, a
government’s right to govern did not descend from God in his heavens, but
from the consent of the governed right here on earth. These philosophers
argued individual citizens surrendered their rights, including their right to
settle disputes through the use of force, only in exchange for a sovereign’s
promise to provide all of those citizens justice, peace, and the possibility of
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a better life. Although these philosophers tended to differ around the edges
and in other areas about exactly what this promise entailed, they all
subscribed to the fundamental notion of what they called the “social
contract”—an agreement among a nation’s individual citizens and between
those citizens and that nation’s government.
As John Locke, perhaps the social contract thinker most influential upon
the founding fathers of our nation, explained:
[P]olitical power is that power which every man having in the state
of nature has given up into the hands of the society. . .with this
express or tacit trust that it shall be employed for their good and
the preservation of their property. . .as he thinks good . . .and to
punish the breach of the law of nature in others. . . . [This power]
can have no other end or measure when in the hands of the
magistrate but to preserve the members of that society in their
lives, liberties, and possessions. . . . And this power has its origins
only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those
who make up the community.9
Other social contract theorists, like Rousseau and Hobbes, echoed
Locke’s words. For example, the following passage stresses one of the key
obligations Hobbes believed the social contract imposed on the sovereign,
e.g., any government.
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him or them
that have the Sovereign Power, that Justice be equally
administered to all degree of People; that is, that as well the rich,
and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the
injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of
impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the
meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them;
For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the
Law of Nature, a Sovereign is. . . subject. . .10
The import of these expressions of social contract theory is this
fundamental precept: citizens would not give up their natural right to settle
disputes through force unless the sovereign offered a peaceful alternative in
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which they have a fair chance to prevail if in the right, no matter whether
they are rich, poor, or something in between. Society, in turn, breaches this
social contract if its forums favor one citizen over the other. The disfavored
person cannot be presumed to have agreed to submit to an unjust
sovereign.11 Thus, the equal administration of justice among different
economic classes is an essential underpinning of any society purportedly
resting on the consent of the governed.12
Over the next hundred years, the social contract theories of these political
philosophers and their revolutionary ideas swept across the European
continent. During the 1800s, several emperors and kings either fell before
the sway of the social contract, or bowed to its terms, thus transforming
from absolute monarchs to constitutional monarchs. Even when these
monarchs did not bow down, most found it necessary to abide by the core
terms of the social contract. This included complying with what Thomas
Hobbes termed a “Precept of the Law of Nature”—equal justice for the poor
and the rich alike.13
Nation after nation actualized this Precept by adopting statutory rights to
counsel in civil as well as criminal cases. It is true the English Parliament
had anticipated the social contract by creating such a right in 1495,
centuries before political theorists had conceived that theory.14 But the
social contract theory undoubtedly influenced the continental European
countries as they followed suit in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. France enacted a statutory civil right to counsel in 1851,15 Italy
embodied that right in its procedural laws at the moment of its birth as a
nation in 1865,16 and Germany also enacted a right to civil counsel when it
became a nation in 1877.17 Most of the rest of Europe was not far behind.18
Notably, when first enacted, none of these statutes provided government
funding for the legal representation they guaranteed.
Rather, the
government drafted private lawyers for this purpose, requiring them to serve
without compensation in return for the privilege of practicing law and
earning fees from those clients who could afford to pay. In most countries,
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it was the twentieth century before governments began paying for the right
they had created, and some still do not.19

II. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT YIELDS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
OF FAIR HEARINGS AND “EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW” IN THOSE
HEARINGS
This article is not concerned with statutory rights, except as evidence
European governments accepted the social contract’s mandate justice must
be administered equally to the poor and the rich, and recognized this meant
they had to provide free lawyers to those who could not afford one. Of
more relevance is the fact this basic “precept” of the social contract also
found its way into the constitutions or “basic laws” of several European
nations. These documents were drafted by practical politicians, not social
contract theorists. Yet, it would have been difficult for those politicians to
be ignorant of that then prevalent political theory or its basic principles. As
might be expected, therefore, these constitutions nearly always included
guarantees all citizens were “equal before the law” or in all judicial
proceedings they were guaranteed “fair trials.”20 All of this was a natural
outgrowth of the social contract and one of its key precepts requiring the
sovereign to provide equal justice to poor and rich alike.
The influence of the social contract did not end at the shores of the
European continent. This fundamental concept and all that flowed from it
also crossed the Atlantic Ocean to the restless English colonies on the
eastern seaboard of North America. Although the American public is often
told the Founding Fathers invented the ideas embodied in the Declaration of
Independence and the U.S. Constitution, most historians credit the social
contract philosophers, and especially John Locke, with many of those
concepts.21 Jefferson himself said that Locke was one of the three greatest
men in all of history (the others being Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton),22
and several of the most renowned passages in the Declaration are
paraphrases of Locke’s writings.23 Perhaps even more significant for
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present purposes, one noted historian observed, “Locke was an intellectual
godparent of James Madison, the Father of the Constitution.”24 Similarly, a
leading political scientist insisted, “Locke is our political philosopher. . .we
can recognize in his work [among other key elements] our insistence on the
rule of law. . .”25
Because social contract theory and the general precept that governments
must dispense justice equally to the rich and the poor were so influential
with those who drafted this nation’s Constitution, it is no surprise that the
Preamble to the U.S. Constitution sets forth “To Establish Justice” as one of
the nation’s four primary goals.26 Nor is it surprising, given the importance
of the social contract, that the Bill of Rights guarantees all U.S. citizens due
process in any judicial proceedings where their “life, liberty, or property” is
at stake.27
European constitutions may have phrased this guarantee in terms of a
“fair hearing” while the Founding Fathers spoke of “due process,” but it is
difficult, if not impossible, to discern a difference. As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes observed in one of his more self-evident pronouncements,
“Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase ‘due
process of law,’ there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental
conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be heard.”28
After the Civil War, the United States also added the analog of another
guarantee which many European countries had already adopted in order to
implement the social contract. As mentioned earlier, some European
constitutions guaranteed their citizens, including the poorest, “equality
before the law.” In the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Constitution came
to guarantee all citizens “equal protection of the laws.” Where due process
promises litigants—poor, rich and middle-class alike—that they will enjoy
a fair hearing in the courts, the Equal Protection Clause promises those
litigants they will have “like access” to court proceedings. That is, all
litigants will stand on an equal footing and have an equal chance of
prevailing if in the right. As the Supreme Court explained long ago:
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The Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that no State “shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,” undoubtedly intended. . .that equal
protection and security should be given to all. . .that they should
have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of
their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs,
and the enforcement of contracts. . . .29
Thus, the language of our Equal Protection Clause and the “equality
before the law” clauses of some European constitutions may differ slightly
in the words they use, but the import of these constitutional clauses remains
identical. This is not surprising, considering the United States Constitution
and these European constitutions share a common source—the social
contract.

III. TWENTIETH CENTURY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL “FAIR HEARING” AND “EQUALITY” GUARANTEES
ON THREE CONTINENTS
The social contract theory was born in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Many nations embodied the basic fair hearing and equality
before the law guarantees in their constitutions or basic laws in the
nineteenth century. But it was the twentieth century before courts began
interpreting the constitutional language and deciding if and when those
clauses required governments to supply free lawyers to their lower income
citizens. In the past sixty-six years, courts on three continents—Europe,
North America, and Africa—have addressed this issue.
A. Europe
The Swiss Supreme Court was the first of the European courts to
confront the issue whether the constitutional guarantees derived from the
social contract require the state to provide free lawyers to litigants who
cannot afford their own. The year was 1937, a full quarter-century before
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the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright30 which granted
criminal defendants in this country a right to free counsel. The Swiss case,
however, did not involve a criminal defendant. Rather, it was an indigent
civil litigant who stood before the court and asked the judges to appoint
counsel to protect his legal rights.
Switzerland is especially instructive for the United States, because like
our country, it is a union of sovereign geographical entities all operating
under the legal umbrella of a federal constitution. In fact, Switzerland is a
confederation in political terms, a looser union than our federal system.
What we call states, Switzerland calls “cantons,” and the Swiss Supreme
Court tends to be reluctant to dictate to the governments of those cantons.
The cantons are subject to the federal constitution, however, and to the
federal Supreme Court’s interpretations of that constitution. The Swiss
federal constitution is one of those containing a guarantee of equality before
the law. It provides: “All Swiss are equal before the law.”31 In a case
entitled simply, Judgment of Oct. 8, 1937, the Swiss Supreme Court
concluded that poor people could not be equal before the law in the regular
civil courts, unless they had lawyers just like the rest of the citizenry. The
court reasoned the constitutional “principle of [equality] before the law”
requires the cantons to provide a free lawyer “in a civil matter where the
handling of the trial demands knowledge of the law.”32 In subsequent
decisions the Swiss Supreme Court has explained and expanded the
circumstances when cantonal governments must supply tax-funded lawyers
to poor civil litigants.33 In what would be considered an anomaly in this
country, it was 1972 before the Swiss Supreme Court held criminal
defendants had a similar constitutional right to free counsel.34
The high courts of other European nations have not been called upon to
decide whether their constitutions (or basic laws) guarantee a right to
counsel in civil cases—but for a simple reason. As discussed earlier, most
of these nations have had statutory guarantees for decades or centuries.35
The German Constitutional Court, however, did confront the issue at least
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once. In its Decision of June 17, 1953, the German Constitutional Court
made it clear that Germany’s constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing in
civil cases may require appointment of free counsel for poor people where
the legal aid statute does not.36
The Swiss and German right to counsel decisions proved to be early
precursors of a ruling with implications across the entire European
continent.37 In 1979, Ireland was almost unique among European countries
in having no legal aid program of any kind. So when an indigent wife, Ms.
Airey, wanted to file a judicial separation suit against her husband, she
could not get a lawyer. When she asked the trial court to appoint counsel,
the judge refused, explaining that Ireland did not provide free counsel to
indigents in civil cases. The court instead invited Ms. Airey to represent
herself in that court. When Ms. Airey appealed the denial of counsel to the
Irish Supreme Court the result was the same, and she received the same
explanation. However, Ms. Airey had one last place to go—the European
Court of Human Rights, in effect the Supreme Court of Europe on questions
of individual rights. (Ms. Airey also had the good fortune of being
represented before the European Court of Human Rights by a former
President of Ireland.)
The European Court of Human Rights interprets and enforces the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 38—the
equivalent of our Bill of Rights—which all members of the European
Community and a number of other European countries have signed. At this
point, forty-five nations are governed by this Convention and bound by the
European Court of Human Right’s interpretations of the Convention’s
provisions.39
The European Convention on Human Rights does not guarantee indigent
civil litigants a right to free counsel in so many words. Nevertheless,
consistent with a fundamental precept of the social contract, Article Six of
the Convention does guarantee all civil litigants a fair hearing.40 In Airey,
the European Court asked whether a person could receive a fair hearing in
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the regular courts without the assistance of a lawyer. After examining that
question from several angles, the European Court concluded the answer was
no, and held the fair hearing guarantee of the European Convention required
the member governments to provide free counsel to those unable to afford
their own.41 In the course of its opinion in Airey, the European Court issued
an unusually powerful statement about government’s affirmative obligation
to provide equal access to justice for low-income citizens:
The Convention was intended to guarantee rights that were
practical and effective, particularly in respect of the right of access
to the courts, in view of its prominent place in a democratic
society…. The possibility of appearing in person before the [trial
court] did not provide an effective right of access.42
The [Irish] Government maintain that. . .in the present case there
is no positive obstacle emanating from the State and no deliberate
attempt by the State to impede access: the alleged lack of access to
the court stems not from any act on the part of authorities but
solely from Mrs. Airey’s personal circumstances, a matter for
which Ireland cannot be held responsible under the Convention.
[T]he Court does not agree. . . . In the first place, hindrance in
fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment.
Furthermore, fulfillment of a duty under the Convention on
occasion necessitates some positive action on the part of the State;
in such circumstances, the State cannot simply remain passive, and
‘there is. . .no room to distinguish between acts and omissions.’
The obligation to secure an effective right of access to the courts
falls into this category of duty.43
As will be explored in more detail within,44 it is interesting to note that in
deciding that effective access in civil cases requires representation by a
lawyer, the European Court discussed many of the same factors to justify a
right to counsel in civil cases as the U.S. Supreme Court had discussed in
Gideon v. Wainright to justify a right to counsel in criminal cases in our
country. The European Court mentioned that the other side in most of these
cases had elected to have lawyers, that most civil litigants who were on the
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same side but could afford lawyers in fact employed them, and that the
procedures and substantive legal rules were relatively complex.45 In
ordinary civil litigation in the ordinary civil courts, the European Court held
that governments must provide free lawyers to indigent civil litigants.46
This ruling now controls litigation for some forty-five nations across the
continent of Europe, comprising the majority of the World’s western
industrial democracies.
B. North America
Closer to home and just four years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada, in
a case closely paralleling the facts of Lassiter, found a constitutional right to
counsel in the fair hearing requirement of Canada’s first written
constitution, the relatively new “Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”47
Like Lassiter, the Canadian case, J.G. v. New Brunswick,48 arose when
the government sought to deprive a mother of her children. In the Canadian
case, however, the province of New Brunswick only sought to continue its
custody over the children for another six months. Had the government tried
to permanently deprive the mother of her parental rights—the stakes
involved in Lassiter—the New Brunswick legal aid law would have
guaranteed the woman free counsel. Furthermore, even in a temporary
deprivation case like this, most other Canadian provinces would have
entitled the mother to legal aid as a matter of statutory law. But New
Brunswick, which has one of the least generously funded legal aid programs
in Canada,49 denied free counsel to poor mothers where they only stood to
lose custody temporarily.
The Canadian Supreme Court ultimately held the New Brunswick
government was constitutionally required to supply indigent parents with
free counsel whenever it proposed to assume or maintain custody of their
children—permanently or temporarily.50 Chief Justice Lamer authored the
principal opinion and first had to address a threshold issue not presented by
the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. While our constitution
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specifically confers its procedural protections on a person’s “life, liberty,
and property,” the relevant provision of the Canadian Charter only extends
to life, liberty, and “security of the person.”
Does the temporary loss of custody of one’s child fit any of these
categories in the Canadian Charter of Rights? Chief Justice Lamer
answered in the following terms:
[T]he right to security of the person protects ‘both the physical
and psychological integrity of the individual’. . .51
For a restriction of security of the person to be made out. . .the
impugned state action must have a serious and profound effect on a
person’s psychological integrity. The effects of the state
interference must be assessed objectively, with a view to their
impact on the psychological integrity of a person of reasonable
sensibility.52. . . [D]irect state interference with the parent-child
relationship. . .is a gross intrusion into a private and intimate
sphere. Further, the parent is often stigmatized as ‘unfit’ when
relieved of custody. As an individual’s status as a parent is often
fundamental to personal identity, the stigma and distress resulting
from a loss of parental status is a particularly serious consequence
of the state’s conduct.53
Chief Justice Lamer then turned to the critical issue: what does the Charter
guarantee when the state files a custody application?
Section 7 guarantees every parent the right to a fair hearing when
the state seeks to obtain custody of their children.54. . . For the
hearing to be fair, the parent must have an opportunity to present
his or her case effectively. Effective parental participation at the
hearing is essential for determining the best interests of the child in
circumstances where the parent seeks to maintain custody of the
child.55 [The statutory scheme] allows parents to be present at and
participate in the hearing, with or without counsel, hear all the
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and present evidence and
make other representations to the court. However, it does not
provide for the payment of legal fees incurred by parents with
respect to an application by [the state].56 In the circumstances of
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this case, the appellant’s right to a fair hearing required that she be
represented by counsel.57
Larmer reached this conclusion by considering the following factors: “the
seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings and
the capacities of [J.G.].”58
So, the Supreme Court of Canada, the only other common law country on
our own continent, has joined the highest court on the European continent in
finding that poor people cannot get a constitutionally guaranteed fair
hearing in the regular courts unless represented by a lawyer. True, the
Canadian Supreme Court has yet to confront this issue in the context of
cases involving property rights. Yet, it is significant that the Canadian court
in 1999 found a right to counsel when a personal right, lesser than the right
involved in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Lassiter, was at
stake.
C. Africa
It is not only democracies in Europe and North America that are
beginning to join this global consensus. In 2001, on the continent of Africa,
one of the world’s newest democracies, South Africa, reached this issue in
the case of Nkuzi v. The Government of the Republic of South Africa and
The Legal Aid Board. 59 This time, the issue was not heard by the nation’s
Supreme Court, but by the Land Claims Court of South Africa. And in this
case, unlike J.G. v. New Brunswick, purely property rights were at stake.
The Land Claims Court has jurisdiction over eviction actions between
tenants or occupiers of land and those asserting ownership. Most of those
tenants or occupiers are poor, uneducated blacks, while those bringing the
eviction actions tend to be wealthy whites. In an action filed by the Legal
Resource Centre, a South African public interest law firm, the tenants
sought a declaration requiring the appointment of free counsel in land
eviction cases where the litigant could not afford counsel, as well as a
requirement that the judge advise those litigants they possessed this right.
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Perhaps because it is such a new democracy, South Africa’s court was
humble enough to look far beyond its own borders and precedents for
guidance. The brief the tenants’ counsel filed was unusually sophisticated
and informed the judges about nearly all the judicial decisions and
reasoning from Europe and North America discussed in this article.
The opinion itself was relatively brief, but two sentences from those two
pages were enough for the Land Claims Court of South Africa to capture
the essence of the rationale for a right to counsel in civil cases. It found that
“There is no logical basis for distinguishing between criminal and civil
matters. The issues in civil matters are equally complex and the laws and
procedures difficult to understand.”60 Accordingly, the court declared:
The persons who have a right to security of tenure in terms of
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, Act 62 of 1997 and the
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, Act 3 of 1996, and whose
security of tenure is threatened or has been infringed, have a right
to legal representation or legal aid at State expense if substantial
injustice would otherwise result, and if they cannot reasonably
afford the cost thereof from their own resources. . . .
. . .The State is under a duty to provide such legal representation or
legal aid through mechanisms selected by it.61
Significantly, neither the South African government nor the Legal Aid
Board appealed the Nkuzi decision to a higher court. Consequently, the
ruling is being followed and enforced in all land eviction cases.62 Thus, the
globalization of this constitutional value continues apace with five
decisions, on three continents, in the sixty-six years since the Swiss
Supreme Court first declared its constitutional guarantee of equality before
the law mandated appointment of free counsel for indigent civil litigants.
Five decisions, covering hundreds of millions of people on this planet, all
have reached the same conclusion. No western court, outside the borders of
the United States, has been willing to find that an indigent civil litigant can
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obtain a fair hearing or equal treatment in the regular courts unless
represented by a lawyer.
Before considering whether these foreign decisions may ever have any
relevance in the United States, it is important to recognize the precise nature
of the right they have declared. It is a different and more complex right
than the one our Supreme Court’s Gideon decision conferred on criminal
defendants. Thus, if Gideon’s trumpet is to sound for civil cases, it will
play a different and more complicated melody.

IV. A “RIGHT TO COUNSEL” IN SOME CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IS NOT
THE SAME AS A “RIGHT TO EQUAL JUSTICE” IN ALL CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS

As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in criminal cases, the
Constitution guarantees an absolute right to counsel; that is, to
representation by a full-fledged lawyer in all cases.63 This is a simple and
straightforward, although quite expensive, right to enforce. In criminal
cases, this right is easily justified, not only by the seriousness of criminal
penalties, but also by the complexity of the criminal process. The
Constitution not only guarantees counsel, but also dictates the essential
elements of criminal procedure that make the assistance of counsel essential
to equal justice for criminal defendants.
In its broad outlines, the American criminal process represents a single
standard method of deciding guilt and innocence. The model is distinctly
adversarial. It features such elements as: jury trials; complex rules of
evidence; constitutional rights against self-incrimination and illegally
obtained evidence that must be raised or waived in the heat of the
courtroom battle; ever more intricate and onerous sentencing schemes; and
a dozen other guaranteed, or at least universal elements that make selfrepresentation, or representation by anything less than a skilled lawyer, a
foolish alternative.
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In contrast, the civil—or, more accurately, the non-criminal—arena is far
more diverse. There is no single model—but rather a panoply of models
(and potential models) for resolving disputes. The regular civil courts, the
forums in which traditional contract, tort, and property litigation occur, are
every bit as complex as the criminal courts, indeed often more so. Hence,
lawyers are as essential for civil litigants in these forums as they are for
criminal defendants in criminal trials. As the European Court emphasized,
in these proceedings the assistance of a lawyer is essential to a fair hearing
and to effective access to justice.64 Consequently, it seems reasonable to
expect any right to equal justice in civil cases to be co-extensive with the
right to counsel when appearing in the regular civil court.
What should be the rule, however, in the many civil forums where
lawyers arguably are not essential for disputants to get a fair chance? At
one extreme, some states actually bar lawyers from representing litigants in
small claims courts.65 Rich, poor and middle-class alike must present their
own cases. Presumably, there are also other forums, including some
officially called “courts,” that are or could be designed to afford nonlawyers equal justice without the assistance of counsel.66
In a less renowned section of its Airey decision, the European Court
recognized this possibility:
[W]hilst Article 6 para. 1 guarantees to litigants an effective right
of access to the courts for the determination of their ‘civil rights
and obligations,’ it leaves to the State a free choice of the means to
be used towards this end. The institution of a legal aid scheme—
which Ireland now envisages in family law matters—constitutes
one of those means but there are others such as, for example, a
simplification of procedure. In any event, it is not the Court’s
function to indicate, let alone dictate, which measures should be
taken; all that the Convention requires is that an individual should
enjoy his effective right of access to the courts in conditions not at
variance with Article 6 (1).67
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Thus, the European Court of Human Rights qualified its holding,
requiring member governments to provide free counsel to indigent litigants
in civil cases. The Court mandated counsel only in cases where the
procedures or the substantive law is sufficiently complex that the expertise
of lawyers makes a substantial difference to the litigant’s chances of
success. The holding left open the option for governments to offer forums
where poor litigants could enjoy effective access to justice without legal
counsel. Thus, what the European Court of Human Rights announced for
the signatory nations to the European Convention was not a right to counsel
as such, but more accurately a right to equal justice in civil cases.
The other foreign decisions discussed above are likewise compatible with
a constitutional right to equal justice, but not an absolute right to counsel in
all civil cases. As in Airey, all of these constitutional decisions involved
proceedings in the regular civil courts, and thus did not directly consider
whether government was required to provide free counsel to indigents in
other forums that resolve civil disputes. All the decisions contained
language suggesting, or at least implying, the right to counsel would not
apply in forums where proceedings were so simple that a disputant had a
fair chance for justice without a lawyer’s knowledge and expertise. For
example, the Swiss Supreme Court specifically limited their citizens’ right
to counsel to cases where “the handling of the trial demands knowledge of
the law.”68 The Canadian Supreme Court went to considerable length to
establish that assistance of counsel was essential to a fair hearing in forums
(in this instance the regular civil courts) where the government seeks to
justify retaining custody of a parent’s child.69 Finally, the South African
Land Reform Court found the land eviction proceedings before it to be no
different in complexity from a criminal trial, and consequently no less
demanding of legal counsel if litigants are to have the fair hearing that
South Africa’s constitutional mandates.70
In one sense, the possibility of satisfying this constitutional imperative,
short of declaring an absolute right to counsel in civil cases, could make it
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easier for an appellate court to recognize such a right. After all, in doing so,
the courts would not be mandating government pay for a lawyer in each and
every civil dispute involving an indigent on one side or the other. Instead,
they would be limiting the mandate to cases and forums where disputants
cannot obtain a fair hearing unless assisted by a lawyer. Moreover, if the
legislative branch considered it too expensive to pay for lawyers in certain
categories of disputes, it could reserve the option of devising forums where
people could get a fair hearing and enjoy effective access without the help
of a lawyer.
Yet, in another sense, this possibility complicates the articulation, and
certainly the administration, of such a right. If the judgment of whether a
proceeding satisfies this right to equal justice is to be made retrospectively
on a case-by-case basis, the right becomes virtually meaningless. Lowincome clients denied counsel would be forced to appeal that denial to the
appellate courts to learn whether their particular circumstances meant they
had been deprived of their constitutional right to equal justice. Only rarely
would such an appellate challenge be feasible—primarily when a legal aid
organization chose to allocate a portion of its limited resources to take that
appeal for the indigent litigant. Consequently, as a practical matter, trial
courts and other forums would be free to adopt their own interpretations of
whether the constitutional right to justice required the provision of free
counsel to indigents appearing in their proceedings.
Thus, if they are to guarantee truly effective access to low income civil
litigants, appellate courts would not only have to recognize a right to equal
justice, but also over time establish definitive standards. Those standards
would have to define when legal representation was required and when
justice could be achieved without providing poor people with free counsel.
In some instances, justice might be achieved by providing less expensive,
non-lawyer advocates,71 and in others, by designing forums that truly
operate fairly without trained advocates of any kind.72 In all likelihood, the
latter would mean a shift from an adversarial model to an inquisitorial
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model of dispute resolution in those forums, in which the judge or other
decision-maker rather than the parties bore the primary responsibility for
uncovering and presenting the facts, as well as identifying the relevant legal
principles.
It may be tempting for appellate courts to draw such a test in broad
strokes, for instance, to hold counsel is required in all cases heard in
“courts,” but not in other forums. This approach disregards the reality that
legal assistance may be required for effective access to justice even in
forums other than the courts. Meanwhile, some forums labeled as courts,
such as California’s Small Claims Courts, may be far fairer to
unrepresented disputants than arbitration, most administrative bodies, and
similar non-judicial tribunals.
Another, perhaps more sound, approach would be to articulate an overarching standard accompanied by a presumption and verified by empirical
testing. The overarching test? What the European Court stated so artfully:
all disputants are entitled to effective access to the court or other disputeresolving forum. The presumption? Virtually the opposite of the
presumption the U.S. Supreme Court majority announced in Lassiter: a
presumption that effective access requires the government to supply free
representation by a lawyer, or a non-lawyer representative where sufficient,
to those who are unable to afford their own representation in all noncriminal cases.
This presumption could only be overcome where a court can legitimately
certify the particular forum deciding the dispute can and does provide a fair
and equal opportunity for justice to those who lack such representation. For
obvious reasons, it would be virtually impossible to overcome this
presumption in a dispute where the other side was represented.73 Likewise,
it would be rare in cases where nearly everyone on the same side as the
indigent disputant, who could afford representation, employs a lawyer or
other paid representative. As the Gideon and Airey opinions emphasize,74
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both of these factors furnish powerful empirical evidence supporting the
need for representation.
The more likely candidates for overcoming this presumption would be
existing or future forums specifically designed to function without lawyers
or other representation. In most instances, this would mean forums built
around an inquisitorial rather than adversarial model of dispute resolution.
The forum itself, rather than the disputants, would have to absorb the
primary responsibility for uncovering the facts and legal principles critical
to a proper decision. This might represent a difficult, but certainly not
impossible, transformation for a judicial system and legal profession
historically committed to the adversarial model. California’s creation
several decades ago of small claims courts that bar lawyers or other
professional representation offers some evidence innovative forums might
evolve that could offer effective access to justice for disputants lacking
representation. Nonetheless, the difficulty of designing dispute resolution
forums capable of operating fairly and effectively without professional
representation is suggested by the fact the California small claims system
has found it necessary to begin employing a coterie of small claims court
advisors. Although they do not represent litigants in the courtroom, these
“advisors” do help litigants assemble the evidence that they will need and
prepare litigants for their appearances before the small claims court
judges.75
Except where forums exist or are created which truly offer disputants
effective access to justice without representation by counsel, the right to
equal justice in civil cases, as is true in all criminal cases, requires the
provision of counsel to those unable to afford their own. Indeed, only the
declaration of a guaranteed right to equal justice, and little short of that step,
appears likely to supply a powerful enough incentive for governments to get
serious about developing innovative forums calculated to afford
unrepresented disputants fair and equal access to justice.
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Europe appears on the verge of incorporating something approaching the
above formula in the text of its new constitution. That is, a formula
guaranteeing legal aid in civil cases while allowing alternative strategies for
delivering effective access to justice. The European community currently is
in the process of considering the adoption of a true continent-wide
“Constitution,” not just a series of “Conventions” among sovereign nations
as they have had until now.76 Section 47 of Article II of the draft
constitution provides: “Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack
sufficient resources insofar as such aid is necessary to ensure effective
access to justice.”77
This constitutional guarantee essentially places into the body of the
European Constitution itself the European Court of Human Rights’
interpretation of the European Convention’s fair hearing provision. In
Airey, that court held the Convention’s fair hearing guarantee meant
indigent civil litigants were to have effective access to justice, along with
everyone else. Furthermore, this required governments to provide free
lawyers when their services were needed to provide that effective access.
Shortly, it appears, the European continent will complete the final step in
the evolution of this right to equal justice from an abstract precept of the
social contract to a guaranteed practical and effective right fixed in the
immutable language of a constitutional provision.
This examination of foreign jurisprudence and constitutional drafting
brings the discussion to the next question: does any of this make a
difference for our country? Will the United States, or any U.S. jurisdiction,
ever recognize this fundamental guarantee as a constitutional right in civil
cases?

V. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND FOREIGN CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS
Will there come a time when the issue our Supreme Court addressed in
Lassiter is no longer framed solely by the precedents and constitutional
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values generated within our borders? When, if ever, will U.S. courts
acknowledge the broad global consensus about the meaning of fundamental
concepts like fair hearing, due process, equality before the law, and equal
protection of the laws? When, if ever, will the U.S. Supreme Court begin
looking at the decisions of high courts of other nations and how those courts
have interpreted constitutional concepts and language also found in our own
constitution?
Based on past experience, the possibility our courts would ever refer to
foreign court decisions interpreting similar constitutional concepts seemed
remote just a few years ago. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Lassiter in 1981 without even mentioning the contrary decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in Airey. This despite the fact that Airey
was filed two years earlier and declared a much broader right to counsel in
civil cases covering a population even larger than the United States.
Indeed, until recently, one would struggle to find any U.S. Supreme Court
opinions in the past two centuries deciding a constitutional issue that even
bothered to mention the high court opinions of other countries and how they
construed those nations’ constitutions.78
Three years ago, however, some light suddenly flickered at the end of the
tunnel. At an international conference the World Bank sponsored in June
2000, two U.S. Supreme Court justices spoke in terms suggesting that they,
at least, saw value in examining foreign court opinions. In her speech to
this assemblage of judges and lawyers from all over the world, Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor urged the audience:
“I would like to see. . .opinions of high courts around the globe, written,
interpreted in several languages and put on Web sites so that the world can
see what you’re doing.”79 One would reasonably assume Justice O’Connor
was expressing not just an idle curiosity in seeing what other nation’s courts
are doing, but an interest in considering those opinions when deciding cases
before our Supreme Court.
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An even more significant prediction of things to come, as it turned out,
was Justice Anthony Kennedy’s comment at that same conference. Justice
Kennedy implicitly promised to pay attention to relevant decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights, if only the judges of that court would
write fully reasoned opinions. In his speech, Justice Kennedy called on that
court to “begin writing decisions which have the capacity and the power to
inspire and persuade.”80 This comment seemed to suggest Justice Kennedy
could find opinions of the European Court of Human Rights to qualify as
persuasive authority in analyzing constitutional issues, if only those
opinions satisfied his test.
That these “off the bench” speeches delivered by Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor might prove to be precursors of things to come in the Supreme
Court’s “on the bench” jurisprudence was confirmed in one of the Court’s
landmark opinions delivered near the end of the 2002–2003 term. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for a six-justice majority in Lawrence v. Texas81 held it
unconstitutional for states to criminalize homosexual sodomy. The opinion
relied heavily on foreign decisions, and in particular, decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights.
In its Lawrence v. Texas decision, the Supreme Court had to deal with
Bowers v. Hardwick,82 an opinion it rendered only seventeen years earlier
upholding the constitutionality of state anti-sodomy laws. Justice Kennedy
found it persuasive that several years before Bowers was decided the
European Court of Human Rights had already found anti-homosexual sex
laws to be invalid under the European Convention. As the Lawrence
majority explained:
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was
decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case
with parallels to Bowers and to today’s case. An adult male
resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing
homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual
conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He
alleged that he had been questioned, his home had been searched,
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and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that the laws
proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981) & ¶ 52. Authoritative in all countries that are
members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations
now), the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the
claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.83
Later in the Lawrence opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized that its
previous Bowers opinion had adopted a distinctly minority view among
western democracies on the constitutionality of laws banning homosexual
conduct.
[To] the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of
Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P. G. & J. H. v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, & ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Sept. 25,
2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993); Norris v.
Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1988). Other nations, too, have taken
action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. See
Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12. The right
the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no
showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or
urgent.84
Admittedly, this sudden interest in foreign constitutional decisions, and
especially those coming from the European Court, is not popular with some
of the present Supreme Court Justices. However, a clear majority of six
justices signed Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence, in contrast to
Justice Scalia’s dissent, which only garnered three votes. In that dissent,
Scalia rebuked the majority for paying any attention whatsoever to what
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courts in the rest of the western democracies may have decided on a similar
constitutional question. He stated:
Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence. . .as the
Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize
conduct. The Bowers majority opinion never relied on “values we
share with a wider civilization,” ante, at 16, but rather rejected the
claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ 478 U.S. at
193-94 (emphasis added). Bowers’ rational-basis holding is
likewise devoid of any reliance on the views of a ‘wider
civilization,’ see id. at 196. The Court’s discussion of these
foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaningless
dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court. . .should not
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’ Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 154 L. Ed. 2d 359, 123 S. Ct. 470, n. (2002)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).85
Not long after the Supreme Court issued the Lawrence opinion, another
Justice voiced strong personal support—and hinted at broader support
within the Supreme Court—for a global approach to constitutional
adjudication. On August 4, 2003, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg told the
American Constitution Society:
Our island or lone-ranger mentality is beginning to change. . .
[Supreme Court Justices] are becoming more open to comparative
and international law perspectives. . . . While you are the American
Constitution Society, your perspective on constitutional law should
encompass the world. We are the losers if we do not both share
our experiences with and learn from others.86
In his speech to the World Bank conference in 2000, Justice Kennedy had
expressed some skepticism about the “capacity and power” of the decisions
the European Court produced to “inspire and persuade.” By 2003, however,
he overcame that reluctance and found persuasive power in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom and its progeny.87 Yet even accepting Justice Kennedy’s
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initial challenge to the European Court to write opinions “with the capacity
to inspire and persuade,” Airey v. Ireland appears to meet that challenge.
This article already presented some of the reasoning and policy
considerations supporting the Airey opinion. To further capture the flavor
of the opinion, however, it is useful to examine the European Court’s
explanation for why counsel is so essential to any litigant, rich or poor, in
the regular courts. In particular, note how the Airey opinion stresses many
of the same reasons the U.S. Supreme Court recited in Gideon v.
Wainwright to support the right to counsel in criminal cases.
After pointing out the absurdity of considering whether ineffective access
to the courtroom could possibly satisfy the constitutional requirement of a
fair hearing, the European Court turned to the critical question of whether
effective access in civil cases requires representation by a lawyer. In
proposing this inquiry, the court stated: “It must therefore be ascertained
whether Ms. Airey’s appearance before the High Court without the
assistance of a lawyer would be effective, in the sense of whether she would
be able to present her case properly and satisfactorily.”88
The court went on to note:
It seems certain to the court that the applicant would be at a
disadvantage if her husband were represented by a lawyer and she
were not. Quite apart from this eventuality, it is not realistic, in the
Court’s opinion to suppose that, in litigation of this nature, the
applicant could effectively conduct her own case, despite the
assistance which, as was stressed by the [Irish] Government, the
judge affords to parties acting in person. . . .
. . .A specialist in Irish family law. . .regards the High Court as the
least accessible court … by reason of the fact that ‘the procedure
for instituting proceedings. . .is complex.’. . .
Furthermore, litigation of this kind, in addition to involving
complicated points of law, necessitates proof of adultery, unnatural
practices or, as in the present case, cruelty; to establish the facts,
expert evidence may have to be tendered and witnesses may have
to be found, called and examined.
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. . .[It is] most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey’s position. . .
can effectively present his or her own case. This view is
corroborated [by the fact] that in each of the 255 judicial
separation proceedings initiated in Ireland in the period from
January 1972 to December 1978, without exception, the petitioner
was represented by a lawyer.89
In conclusion, the court took all of the above considerations into account
when it stated that “the possibility to appear in person before the High Court
does not provide the applicant with an effective right of access.”90
Compare now the rationale of the Airey decision with that found in
Gideon and their relative “capacity to persuade and inspire.” Just as the
European Court of Human Rights did when it considered an unrepresented
litigant’s prospects in civil court, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gideon
justified its declaration of the constitutional right to counsel in criminal
cases by stressing the fact that most people of means hire lawyers when
facing trial in the criminal courts.91 And, like the Airey court, the Gideon
court utilized the judges’ own familiarity with what is required to find and
present evidence in a courtroom to draw the conclusion a lawyer’s
assistance was necessary for the defendant to have an effective defense.92
But, the Airey court actually went further than the U.S. Supreme Court in
justifying the need for counsel in civil cases. The European Court also
considered expert testimony, demonstrating that the law and procedure were
so complex a layperson could not represent him or herself “properly and
satisfactorily.”93
Because the Gideon opinion is fairly typical of the “capacity and the
power to inspire and to persuade” found in U.S. Supreme Court opinions,
and the depth and quality of the analysis in Gideon and Airey are so similar,
it appears difficult to discount Airey on that score. When, as in Airey, a
decision of the European Court satisfies Justice Kennedy’s test and
addresses common constitutional language or comparable constitutional
concepts, that foreign decision would seem to merit serious consideration
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Indeed, there appears to be more reason to pay attention to Airey when
attempting to divine the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s due process and
equal protection clauses as applied to an indigent civil litigant’s right to
counsel than to consider the European Court’s stance on homosexual sexual
conduct. For reasons explored earlier,94 the text of our constitution and the
European Convention interpreted in Airey derive from the same
fundamental concept—a key element of the social contract theory both
documents implement.
Once the U. S. Supreme Court, or a state supreme court, acknowledges
that it should pay attention to how foreign courts construe constitutional
values we share in common, it will be difficult to ignore the growing global
consensus among jurisdictions with written constitutions, that one of the
core constitutional values is a right to equal justice. Moreover, it will be
equally difficult to ignore the consequence this right to equal justice that
embraces a right to counsel, at the very least in cases tried in the regular
courts. The Swiss Supreme Court, German Supreme Court, European
Court, Canadian Supreme Court, and South Africa’s Land Claims Court
have all reached this same conclusion. These courts saw no alternative but
to require government to provide free counsel to poor civil litigants, if the
government were to satisfy the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing or
equality before the law for those too poor to afford their own lawyers—at
least in those cases where the substantive or procedural law is sufficiently
complex as to require a lawyer’s services for a fair and equal chance at
justice.

VI. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, AND
AMERICA’S POOR
The evolving global consensus in support of a guaranteed right to equal
justice also appears to be shared by the American public. Polls suggest four
in five Americans believe, erroneously of course, that poor people already
have a guaranteed right to counsel when sued in the civil courts, just as they
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do when prosecuted in the criminal courts.95 Clearly, ordinary Americans
have a very different interpretation of the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution than do the nation’s judges. It is not
difficult to understand why. From kindergarten on, Americans raise their
right hands and pledge allegiance to a nation promising “justice for all.”
The constitution they study in school guarantees them that no one can be
deprived of “property” as well as “life” or “liberty” without due process of
law. That same constitution also promises they shall enjoy “equal
protection of the laws.” Several times a week, they see the image of the
U.S. Supreme Court building on their television screens or in the pages of
their newspapers or magazines. Featured prominently in that image, they
see the promise of “Equal Justice Under Law” chiseled in marble over the
entrance of this grand temple of our judicial system.
Could it be the citizens of this country are born, or at least raised, with an
implicit understanding of the social contract and what it must mean for their
rights and those of their fellow Americans? That regular citizens, perhaps
better than lawyers, judges, or law professors, comprehend the terms of the
social contract they tacitly agree to as members of this democratic society?
Is it possible most of them could not comprehend why anyone would
consent to join a society that would deny them equal justice if they were, or
became, poor? Are they realistic enough to know no one has a fair chance
for justice in a typical courtroom unless that person has a lawyer at her
side? Certainly, if the answer to the question is yes it would explain why so
many of our citizens hold the erroneous view that Americans already enjoy
a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases if they are too poor to employ
her own.
Nevertheless, under our system of government, judges, not the general
public, interpret constitutions. Constitutional rights are declared by
Supreme Courts—the U.S. Supreme Court for the entire country and state
supreme courts for the individual states—and not by the supreme courts of
Europe, Canada, or any other nation. Therefore, the American people, and

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound a New Melody?

especially America’s poor, can only wait and see if their expectations will
be realized by the only authority equipped to do so.

VII. CONCLUSION
This article began with a quote from the Chief Justice of California,
Ronald George. In his annual “State of the Judiciary” speech delivered to
the California legislature, Chief Justice George warned, “If the motto ‘and
justice for all’ becomes ‘and justice for those who can afford it,’ we threaten
the very underpinnings of our social contract.” In a very real sense, this
article has been an explanation of why this is so. It has explored the
intimate and historical connection between “justice for all” (including and
especially poor people) and the “social contract.” Deny the first and you
definitely and profoundly breach the other. The article has also traced the
link between the social contract and the fundamental concepts embodied in
the due process and equal protection provisions of our constitution, and has
revealed how other societies based on the social contract have interpreted
those same concepts to require effective access to justice (including free
lawyers where needed) for all their citizens.
Unfortunately, for many of this nation’s lower income people—those
who cannot be served with the limited resources currently devoted to
providing them representation—the “If” in Justice George’s warning is
really a “Because.” That is, “Because the motto ‘and justice for all’ already
is ‘and justice for those who can afford it,’” we already “threaten the very
underpinnings of our social contract.” 96 Because of this reality, the social
contract has been breached and many unfortunate millions are destined to
be denied justice in America’s courts.97
Thus, the subject of this article is something more than an academic
exercise, one inquiring whether a right to equal justice is a part of the social
contract, whether the constitutional due process and equal protection
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution implement that right to equal justice,
and whether that right to equal justice would require free counsel for
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indigent litigants in many civil cases. Instead, the subject of this article has
real consequences for real people. For without the effective access to
justice such a right would guarantee, poor people in this country today too
often unjustly lose their housing, their possessions, their livelihood, their
children, and nearly everything else that makes life worth living.
Whether America finally joins the growing consensus among western
democracies and declares that neither our own social contract nor our
constitution can continue to tolerate such daily injustices—that question
only time and our nation’s courts will answer.
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Earl Johnson, Jr. & Elizabeth Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally
Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants, 11
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 249–50 (1978).
3
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981). The facts of
Lassiter could scarcely have been less favorable for the Supreme Court to declare that
due process required appointment of counsel in civil cases. The petitioner was a
convicted murderess serving a lengthy prison sentence, who allegedly had not been in
contact with her child for several years when the state sought to terminate her parental
rights. The state afforded the petitioner the right to appointed counsel in the hearing
where it initially sought to take custody of her child. However, the state denied her the
same right when it sought to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Moreover, the
termination proceedings were informal enough that social workers rather than lawyers
sometimes represented the state, although a lawyer opposed Ms. Lassiter in her case.
Despite these circumstances, four of the nine justices were prepared to reverse and
remand for a trial at which the petitioner would have the assistance of counsel.
4
The majority opinion first justified and announced this presumption:
The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this Court’s precedents
on an indigent’s right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been
recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he
loses the litigation. . . . [W]e thus draw from them the presumption that an
indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may
be deprived of his physical liberty. It is against this presumption that all the
other elements in the due process decision must be measured.
Id. at 25–26. (The dissenters challenged both the presumption and its underlying
generalization about the Court’s precedents. Id. at 40–42.)
The majority then adopted the three-part test, devised in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976), as the appropriate approach in deciding whether due process
demanded the appointment of counsel for indigents in cases not implicating physical
freedom. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. The Mathews case,
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propounds three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due process
requires, viz., the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the
risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions. We must
balance these elements against each other, and then set their net weight in the
scales against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only
where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.
Id. (The dissenters agreed and applied the Eldridge factors, but disagreed that the “net
weight” of those factors had to overcome a presumption against appointment of counsel
in civil cases. Id. at 42.)
In weighing the Eldridge factors, the majority conceded the “private interest at stake,”
a parent’s interest in “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children” was “a commanding one.” Id. at 27. The majority then pointed out the
“government’s interest” was two-fold. See id. at 27–28. On the one hand, like the
parent, it has an interest in an accurate and just determination of whether the child should
remain tethered to the parent. Id. But, on the other hand, it has a pecuniary interest in
avoiding the cost of providing counsel to the parent and the cost of a delayed and perhaps
longer proceeding. Id. at 28. Significantly, the majority conceded that additional cost
was not sufficient “to overcome private interests as important as those here . . .” Id.
Thus, it was the third Eldridge factor—the risk of error—that the majority found
determinative in calculating the “net weight” to set on the scale with the presumption
against appointed counsel. In Lassiter, the Court emphasized the relative informality of
the proceeding, somehow discounted studies showing represented parents prevailed
several times as frequently as unrepresented ones in North Carolina termination cases (as
they did in some other jurisdictions), and also focused tightly on the particular factual
circumstances of the case and the litigant. Significantly, along the way, even the majority
justices highlighted circumstances that they felt might alter the equation enough to
overcome the presumption. See id. at 28–32. Finally, the majority refused to articulate
any standards for deciding when counsel would be constitutionally required, but opted
instead for a retroactive case-by-case evaluation of whether the absence of a lawyer
denied due process in a particular case. Id. at 32. (The dissenters examined the same
three factors, reached a different balance, and also disputed the merits of the retroactive
case-by-case approach that the Gideon case had rejected for criminal cases, and for much
the same reasons.) See id. at 42–52.
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See Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 305, 309 (1979). The facts and holding
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infra.
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Id.
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U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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and public hearing . . .” Convention for the Protection for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
9
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As one modern synthesis of Locke’s SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT explains:
Locke sees that, when men have multiplied and land has become scarce, rules
are needed beyond those which the moral law or the law of nature supplies.
But the origin of government is traced not to this economic necessity, but to
another cause. The moral law is always valid, but it is not always kept. In the
state of nature all men equally have the right to punish transgressors: civil
society originates when, for the better administration of the law, men agree to
delegate this function to certain officers. Thus government is instituted by a
“social contract”; its powers are limited, and they involve reciprocal
obligations; moreover, they can be modified or rescinded by the authority
which conferred them.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://www.utm.edu/research/
iep/l/locke.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003) (emphasis supplied). The people who signed
the social contract are those who delegated the power to the officers (e.g., the courts) in
the form of authority. Furthermore, the signers of the social contract retain the right to
rescind the authority if the courts do not provide a fair process.
12
Political philosopher John Rawls, a modern exponent of social contract theory, would
use a somewhat modified model to explore this issue. His basic approach is to employ a
hypothetical double-blind experiment where it is assumed no one knows whether they are
going to be rich, poor, or somewhere in between (or what other advantages, such as
intelligence or health, they will possess). See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). Rawls terms this “The Veil of Ignorance.” Then, he asks what social
and political arrangements a group of rational people would agree to before they know
the hand they would be dealt.
Rawls has not applied this approach to the specific issue considered in this article—
whether society should supply those who lack sufficient economic means with the
lawyers (or other resources) required to have a fair chance in the courts or other dispute
resolution forums. Properly framed, however, it is difficult to imagine that the question
would yield anything but an affirmative response from Rawls’ hypothetical group of
people who would not know where they would rank on the income scale. Realistically as
well as hypothetically, how many people would want to risk entering a courtoom in
which they would face near certain defeat because the other side could afford a lawyer
and they could not?
Rawls on the other hand, has applied his theoretical approach to a somewhat related
issue, the relative equality of income distribution within a society. In this analysis, he
concluded a group of people unaware of where they would stand on the income scale
would opt for a substantially more equitable distribution of income than is found
currently in the United States. According to Rawls, is that a rational group of people
making this decision behind a “veil of ignorance” would only tolerate inequality to the
degree the resulting increase in productivity enhanced the size of the share the lowest
income strata received. Id. at 136–42. If this is true, a fortiori, this same hypothetical
group would only accept a dispute resolution system where that same low income strata
had a fair chance of prevailing if in the right.
13
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supra note 11.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Will Gideon's Trumpet Sound a New Melody?

14

In Forma Pauperis Act, II Hen. VII, c. 12 (1495), translated in John Macarthur
Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 373 (1923).
15
MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JAMES GORDLEY & EARL JOHNSON, JR., TOWARD EQUAL
JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 19 n.57 (1975)
(citing Law of Jan. 22, 1851, Arts. 1-20 (1851), Bull. Des Lois 93).
16
Id. at 19 n.59 (citing Law of Dec. 6, 1865, no. 2627, [1865] Rac. Uff. 2846).
17
Id. at 19 n.62 (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG of Jan. 30, 1877 §§ 114-27 (1877).
18
Many of these historical statutory “right to counsel” provisions are set forth in
CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 15.
19
See generally CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 15, at 19-20.
20
See pp. 210-15, supra, for examples of these constitutional provisions.
21
See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY
OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1922).
22
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the American painter John Trumbull, in 1789,
ordering portraits of “the three greatest men that have ever lived,” referring to John
Locke, Francis Bacon, and Isaac Newton, available at http://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/treasures/ trm033.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003).
23
For example, Locke wrote: “In this state of nature all men are equal in the sense that
they are endowed with certain natural, or inalienable rights which no other individual
may justifiably infringe,” available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~ejv/jefferson.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2003). Jefferson produced an admittedly more eloquent version of the
same fundamental notion in the Declaration of Independence. “We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights . . .” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776) available at http://www.archives.gov/national_archives_ experience/declaration.
html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003). Likewise, in the latter document, Locke’s “life, liberty,
and property” became “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
24
LEE CAMERON MCDONALD, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY: THE MODERN AGE 111
(1962).
25
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 7–8 (David Wooton ed., Mentor 1993) (quoting
Professor Nathan Tarcov) (second emphasis added).
26
“We the People of the United States, in Order to . . . establish Justice . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl.
27
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis
supplied).
29
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (emphasis supplied).
30
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
31
CONST. OF THE SWISS FEDERATION, art. IV, translated in CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra
note 15, at 705.
32
Francis William O’Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss
Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1967) (quoting Judgment of October 8, 1937, Arrêts du
Tribunal Fédéral [ATF] 63, I, 209 (Switz.)).
33
The Swiss Supreme Court wrote:

VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003

235

236 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
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Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (stating that “lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries”).
64
See Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 315.
65
“Except as permitted by this section, no attorney may take part in the conduct or
defense of a small claims action.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530(a) (2003). [The
exceptions are for proceedings in which the attorney is a party or the law firm of which
he is a member is a party [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530(b) (2003)]. Attorneys also
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Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 317 (emphasis supplied).
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emphasize, however, the process used in the administrative proceedings he studied was
comparatively informal and the substantive law was comparatively straightforward and
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Some of the possibilities are surveyed in Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte, Tributaries of
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JUSTICE: VOLUME II – PROMISING INSTITUTIONS (Mauro Cappelletti & John Weisner
eds., 1979). For an analysis of innovative approaches derived from this survey, see Earl
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Cappelletti & Bryant G. Garth eds., 1979).
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effect of legal representation (and its absence) among the variables analyzed. In most of
these forums, one side—creditor, landlord, etc.—was represented by counsel nearly all
the time while the other side—debtor, tenant, etc.—was rarely represented. All of these
studies tended to confirm the hypothesis the latter had a much better chance of prevailing
when they did have legal counsel than when they did not.
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Bankruptcy cases: During the period covered by a study of Chapter 13 bankruptcy
cases only 2 percent of unrepresented debtors succeeded in obtaining a discharge of their
debts, compared with 27 percent of represented debtors. (The success ratio for
unrepresented debtors could have risen to a maximum of 12 percent assuming all those
with cases still pending at the conclusion of the study obtained discharge, while as many
as 82 percent of represented debtors might have achieved their goal, under the same
assumption.) Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987,
2070 n. 299 (1999) (reporting the results of an unpublished study by Gary Klein &
Maggie Spade, Self-representation in the Bankruptcy Court: The Massachusetts
Experience 1 (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., 1996). This same study indicated virtually all
creditors who were on the other side of the case from the pro se debtors had legal
representation.
Family law cases: A 1992 study of 16 urban jurisdictions revealed only one side was
represented by counsel in fully 53 percent of divorce cases, while both sides were
represented in 28 percent and neither side was represented in 18 percent. John A. Goerdt,
Divorce Courts: Case Management, Case Characteristics, and the Pace of Litigation in
16 Urban Jurisdictions (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 1992). Comparative outcome
statistics were unavailable; moreover, in a substantial percentage of cases both sides
wanted the same result. But a related study did report that, overall, 72 percent of pro se
petitioners would proceed pro se again, while only 36 percent of pro se respondents who
faced petitioners represented by counsel said they would proceed on a pro se basis if
required to litigate again in family court. American Bar Association Standing Committee
on the Delivery of Legal Services, Responding to the Needs of the Self-Represented
Divorce Litigant 11 (ABA, 1994) (reporting on results of an earlier committee sponsored
study, Self-Representation in Divorce Cases (ABA, 1992)). This same result is reported
in a revised version of the latter study published as Bruce D. Sales, et al., Is SelfRepresentation A Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases,
37 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 553, 593 (1995).
Small Claims Courts [which permit legal representation]: In a study of the Iowa Small
Claims Courts, represented defendants were four times more likely to win than
unrepresented defendants [13 percent to 3 percent] and represented plaintiffs were
significantly more likely to win than unrepresented plaintiffs [93 percent to 86 percent].
Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An
Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 511 (1990). The majority of plaintiffs were
businesses seeking to collect debts and landlords seeking to collect rent. They won most
of the time, and nearly all the time when the debtors or tenants lacked legal
representation.
Housing courts: New York’s housing courts theoretically provide a simplified forum
more hospitable to unrepresented litigants—landlords or tenants—than the traditional
landlord-tenant courts they replaced. However, a recent randomized study reveals
lawyers still make a great difference in a tenant’s chances before these courts. “For
example, only 22% of represented tenants had final judgments against them, compared
with 51% of tenants without legal representation. Similarly large advantages for tenants
with an attorney also were found in eviction orders and stipulations requiring the landlord
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to provide rent abatements or repairs.” Carroll Seron, et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel
on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a
Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419, 419 (2001).
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See pp. 228-29, infra, for language from these opinions stressing the presence of
counsel on the other side, or the fact most similarly situated litigants who possessed
means employed lawyers, furnished strong evidence that indigent litigants likewise
required counsel in the proceedings those courts were considering.
75
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charge . . .”). See also CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 116.920(b) (2003) (stating that courts
must also provide all small claims litigants notice these advisory services are available to
assist them).
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See Velida Pearce, New European Constitution—What Does It Really Say? 57 INT’L.
B. NEWS 3 (Sept. 2003) for a discussion of the proposed constitution and the process for
its adoption. According to this article, the document is scheduled to be signed during
May 2004.
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Draft EUR. CONST. pt. II, tit. IV, art. II, § 47 (emphasis supplied).
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As recently as 1998, an author was able to observe the U.S. Supreme Court “has never
referred to any decisions of the European Court [of Human Rights] or [the European]
Commission of Human Rights,” at least in a majority opinion. Claire L’Heureuse-Dubé,
The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist
Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 38 (1998). For a thorough review of the Supreme Court’s past
reluctance to consider foreign judicial decisions and a prescient prediction this would
change within the next five years, see Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and
United States Law: Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417 (2000).
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Laurie Asseo, Three members of Supreme Court Promote Rule of Law in Other
Countries, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 6, 2000.
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Id. Interestingly, in this same speech, Justice Kennedy praised legal aid programs as
providing a “necessary safety valve for the stability of government.”
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See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96 (1986).
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Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
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Gina Holland, Ginsburg Backs More Global View for America’s Judicial Decisions,
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Two polls, conducted in 1991, probed the respondents’ understanding of their
constitutional rights. One was sponsored by the California Bar Association [CALIFORNIA
STATE BAR REPORT, Bar Survey Reveals Widespread Legal Illiteracy, 11 CAL. LAWYER
68, 69 (1991)] and the other by a national conference commemorating the 200th
anniversary of the adoption of the Bill of Rights [ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF
AMERICA, 1991-1992 DESK REFERENCE SUPPLEMENT: COMMEMORATING THE 200TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (Karen D. Horsley et al. eds.,
1991)]. Both polls included a form of the question, whether, if the respondent were poor
and sued in a civil court, would they would have a right to free counsel. Sixty-nine
percent of Californians and 79 percent of citizens in the national survey responded,
erroneously, yes, to that hypothetical. In both polls, this question elicited the highest rate
of erroneous responses about the rights that our constitution guarantees.
96
To his great credit, Chief Justice George has done far more than any other judicial
leader in California history to narrow that breach in the social contract. He was largely
responsible for passage of a law creating the first state government funding of civil legal
services in California, the “Equal Access Fund.” He set up a statewide network of
“family facilitators” to assist unrepresented litigants in family court cases and several
innovative self-help center experiments. In the past year, under Justice George’s
leadership, the court system’s website opened a huge self-help section containing some
900 pages of content. Recently, it added a Spanish language section that duplicates all
the contents of the English language site. Chief Justice George also has taken several
steps to encourage expanded pro bono services from the private bar.
These initiatives, as well as others, are described in a report the California
Commission on Access to Justice published in late 2002. As this report also documents,
however, despite all of Justice George’s efforts and those of many others, for the majority
of lower income residents California still remains a state with justice not for them, but
only “for those who can afford it.” See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON ACCESS TO
JUSTICE, The Path to Equal Justice: A Five Year Status Report on Access to Justice in
California (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_
home.jsp (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
97
Studies document that 70 to 80 percent of impoverished people with problems
requiring legal assistance are unable to find a lawyer. For instance, a recent California
status report found 72 percent of California’s impoverished with legal problems could not
be served. Id. at 29–30. This should not be a surprise, given the fact that on average,
each legal services lawyer serves a population of nearly 10,000 low-income people—
while the ratio for the rest of Californians is one lawyer for every 245 people. Id. at 31.
Of the total public and private funds Californians spend on lawyers, less than a half
percent goes to provide civil legal aid to the nearly 20 percent of residents who are
eligible for such services. Id. at 34. And total expenditures on civil legal aid for the
more than 6.4 million low-income people in California, are less than a quarter of the
annual gross income of a single corporate law firm headquartered in that state that serves
a relative handful of business clients each year. Id.
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